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NEW YORK'S CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF LAND
USE LAW: PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION
CO. v. CITY OF NEW YORK
INTRODUCrION
Grand Central Terminal, an "irreplaceable" structure of "inesti-
mable" significance, was designated a landmark by New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Commission on August 2, 1967.1 In its offi-
cial designation report, the Commission called the terminal "a mag-
nificent example of French Beaux Arts architecture," "unique in qual-
ity, distinction and character," a structure that has played "a significant
role in -the life and development of New York City."2 Thereafter, the
terminal could not be altered unless the Commission found the pro-
posed change would either have no effect on the structure's exterior,
or that it would be appropriate in light of the designation's purpose.
3
Five months later, Penn Central Transportation Company (Penn Cen-
tral) entered into a lease with UGP Properties which provided for
UGP to construct an office tower above the terminal.4 Penn Central
had planned the project in order to reduce the losses that had brought
the company to insolvency and bankruptcy; 5 it expected to receive after
the tower was completed not less than $3 million annually from UGP
under the lease.6 Existing concessions in the terminal that would be
1. The Commission has the power to designate a list of landmarks, NEw YORK
CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 a(1), j (1976), and, after a public hear-
ing, to designate a landmark site for each landmark, id. § 207-2.0 b. See id. § 207-1.0
n, o. The Commission must file a copy of the designation with the appropriate city
agencies including the Board of Estimate. Id. § 207-2.0 f. The Board of Estimate then
refers the designation to the City Planning Commission which will file a report with the
Board concerning the relation of the designation to current and future land use plans.
Id. § 207-2.0 g(1). The Board may then modify or disapprove the designation. Id.
§ 207-2.0 g(2). The designation is effective when adopted by the Commission, and any
modification becomes effective on the date the Board adopts the modification. Id. § 207-
2.0 e, g(2).
2. Landmarks Preservation Commission, Official Designation Report, August 2,
1967, Number 2, LP-0286, reprinted in Record on Appeal, Exhibit F at 2, Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1977).
3. NEW YORK CIr, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0 a(l) (1971).
4. See 173 N.Y.L.J. at 16, col. 3 (Jan. 23, 1975) for the report of the special
master which outlines the history of this case.
5. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 270, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20, 26 (1975).
6. Id.
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eliminated by the tower generated approximately $700,000 to $1,000,-
000 in net rents.7 After futile attempts to utilize the provisions in the
law which would allow alteration of the terminal, 8 Penn Central and
UGP brought an action for a judgment declaring New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law 9 unconstitutional as applied to the ter-
minal.
At trial term, Justice Saypol held the law, as applied to plaintiff,
an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensa-
tion. He also said the law deprived Penn Central of property without
due process and equal protection of the law.10 The Appellate Division
disagreed with Justice Saypol's interpretation of a New York Court of
Appeals precedent,'1 and reversed, two judges dissenting.' 2 The major-
ity applied the traditional diminution in value test 3 to determine
7. Id.
8. Penn Central applied for a certificate of no effect which was denied in 1968.
After new plans were drawn, it applied for a certificate of appropriateness. This was
denied in 1969. These certificates are part of the law's attempt to ameliorate the
proscription against altering the landmark. NEW YORK CiTy, N.Y., ADmiN. CODE, ch.
8A, § 207-4.0 a(1) (1976). If the proposed work would not change any exterior
architectural feature and, for a new improvement, if it would be in harmony with the
external appearance of neighboring improvements, a certificate of no effect will be is-
sued. Id. § 207-5.0 a(1). If the certificate is denied, the applicant may still file a re-
quest for a certificate of appropriateness. Id. § 207-5.0 a(3).
A certificate of appropriateness will be granted only if the Commission finds that
the proposed change to the structure "would be appropriate for and consistent with the
effectuation of the purposes" of the Landmarks Preservation Law. Id. § 207-6.0a. The
Commission will consider the effects of the proposed change on that part of the struc-
ture which "cause it to possess a special character or special historical or aesthetic in-
terest or value." Id. § 207-6.0 d. A public hearing must be held on each request for a
certificate of appropriateness. Id. § 207-7.0.
9. NEW YORK Cnry, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A (1976) (originally enacted as
Local Law No. 46 of the City of New York, April 19, 1965). The ordinance was en-
acted pursuant to a state enabling act. 1956 N.Y. Laws ch. 216, § 1, as amended by
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977) ("Protection of historical places, build-
ings and works of art.").
10. 173 N.Y.L.J. at 16, col. 8 (Jan. 23, 1975). See generally Comment, Grand
Central Station-Landmark at the End of the Line, or End of the Line for Landmarks?
New York City's Landmark Law in the Courts, 37 U. PITT. L. REv. 81 (1975).
11. Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d
305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). Justice Saypol said Lutheran Church "held that landmarks
designation generally constitutes a taking for which compensation is mandated." 173
N.Y.L.J. at 16, col. 5 (Jan. 23, 1975). Justice Murphy, in the majority opinion for the
Appellate Division, felt that this interpretation "would surely, as the amicus brief sub-
mitted hereon states, 'eviscerate New York's Landmarks Preservation Law.'" Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 271, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 27
(1975).
12. 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
Once it is demonstrated that the restriction serves some legitimate public pur-
pose, the property owner, in order to sustain the attack on constitutional
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whether the law deprived Penn Central of all reasonable beneficial
use of its property. It concluded that plaintiffs had failed to sustain
their burden of proof because they did not show an incapacity to earn
a reasonable return. According to the court, expense items in Penn
Central's revenue statement improperly attributed railroad operating
expenses to real estate operations. Moreover, no rental value was im-
puted to the space in the terminal devoted to railroad purposes.' 4 The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Landmarks preservation is a legiti-
mate police power goal. In exercising this power, government need
only assure a reasonable return or an equivalent private use to the
property owner. Furthermore, the Constitution does not require gov-
ernment to assure a return on that part of property reflecting attributes
derived from the "social complex" in which the property rests. Nor
need the guaranteed return on this privately created ingredient of
property be in the form of a profit; income may be imputed from
nearby and related structures of common ownership. Finally, develop-
ment rights may be transferred, thus preserving a property owner's
economic interest. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law lists among its pur-
poses the protection of prized possessions representing elements of the
city's cultural, social, economic, political, and architectural history. 15
Also included as purposes are: safeguarding the city's historic, aes-
thetic, and cultural heritage; protecting property values; fostering civic
pride; enhancing tourism; strengthening -the city's economy; and pro-
moting, for the education, pleasure, and welfare of the people, the use
of these structures.'6 The law provides the means by which landmarks
grounds, must further establish that the resulting hardship is suck as to deprive
him of any use of the property to which it is reasonably adapted, or serves
to destroy the greater part of its value . . . . The question, in this latter re-
gard, is essentially one of degree and where the ordinance goes so far as to
preclude the use of the property for any purpose to which it is reasonably
adapted, it is confiscatory and must be held unconstitutional.
Id. at 226, 275 N.E.2d at 588, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
14. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 273, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20, 28 (1975).
15. Nnw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIIN. CODE, Ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 b(a) (1976).
16. Id. § 205-1.0 b. According to one commentator, these encompass "every
reason ever advanced for historic preservation." Comment, Legal Methods of Historic
Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. Rav. 611, 631 (1970). Aesthetics is now generally ac-
cepted as a legitimate zoning goal. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 A.D.2d
376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain and the
Preservation of Historic Property, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 708 (1963). There are, how-
ever, few decisions upholding governmental regulation solely on consideration of aes-
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are to be designated, 17 and regulates any changes to the landmark or
its declared site.18 Certain ameliorative provisions are also available for
landmark owners who demonstrate that the law has caused them hard-
ship.'
9
In its first test, Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission,20 a lower court held the law constitutional. Later, in Trustees
of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt,2 the Appellate Division found that
the law provides inadequate relief when an owner is a charitable or-
ganization seeking to retain the land and replace the structure.2 That
court would not, however, question the right of government to re-
strict land use "for -the cultural and aesthetic benefit of the commu-
thetics. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963) ;
cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (urban redevelopment effectuated through
exercise of power of eminent domain upheld on aesthetic considerations).
17. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 (1976). See note I
supra.
18. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-4.0 (1976).
19. Economic hardship may provide sufficient grounds for granting a certificate of
appropriateness. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 (1976).
When an applicant for a certificate of appropriateness establishes that the parcel is
incapable of earning a reasonable return, id. § 207-8.0 a(1), the Commission will at-
tempt to devise a plan to improve the return and save the landmark. § 207-8.0 b. The
plan may include tax exemptions, tax remissions, and authorization for some alteration.
Id. § 207-8.0 c. A plan consisting only of tax exemptions or remissions that the Com-
mission finds satisfactory will result in the denial of the certificate. Id. § 207-8.0 e(1).
The owner may reject a plan consisting of other than tax exemptions or remissions.
Id. § 207-8.0 f(1), (2). If a plan is neither formulated nor approved by the Commis-
sion, or is rejected by the owner, then the Commission may recommend to the Mayor
that the City acquire a protective interest in the landmark. Id. § 207-8.0 g(1).
These hardship provisions are unavailable to an owner whose parcel has received
real estate tax exemptions for three years preceding the application. Id. § 207-8.0 a(2).
Although there are exceptions to this general exclusion, the partial tax exemption
granted to the terminal is not within this list. Id. § 207-8.0 a(2); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAx LAW § 489-ff (McKinney Supp. 1977).
20. 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966). Manhattan Club was concerned
in part with a challenge to the reasonableness of the designation, i.e., whether the
designation was supported by substantial evidence. For a discussion of the standard of
reasonableness to be applied in evaluating the propriety of a designation, see Zartman
v. Reisem, 59 A.D.2d 237, 240-41, 399 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509-10 (4th Dep't 1977)
(concerning a Rochester landmarks preservation statute).
21. 29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968).
22. The law provides that a tax exempt organization demonstrating hardship may
be relieved of this burden only if it has entered into an agreement to sell the fee or a
term of at least twenty years. The requirements for granting a certificate of appropriate-
ness are thus different for taxed and tax exempt owners. The former need not have en-




nity." 23 In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 24 the
Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division's interpretation
and struck down the designation of a brownstone once owned by J. P.
Morgan, Jr. that could no longer adequately house the offices of a
charitable organization. Court challenges to Landmark designations
have been few, however. The Landmarks Preservation Commission has
designated approximately three hundred landmarks and a dozen his-
toric districts containing more than thirty-five hundred buildings.2
The instant case presented the courts with a unique situation be-
cause Grand Central Terminal is no ordinary landmark. Since Penn
Central could neither alter the existing structure 26 nor avail itself of
the special hardship provisions of the law,2 7 the trial court held the
law's application unconstitutional. But this holding ignored a crucial
interest which Judge Breitel later identified: society, "by the sweat of
its brow and the expenditure of its funds," has contributed to the
property's value which the owner sought to convert into profit.28 And,
"[t]o that extent, society is also entitled to its due."' 9
I. TAKINGS: FROM PENNSYLVANIA COAL TO PENN CENTRAL
It is apparent from the cases and literature that "our ability to
distinguish satisfactorily between 'takings' in the constitutional sense,
for which compensation is compelled, and exercises of the police
power, for which compensation is not compelled, has advanced only
slightly since the Supreme Court began to struggle with the prob-
lem."30 Underlying the recurrent conflict between private land own-
23. 29 A.D.2d at 377, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 315. The Appellate Division remanded for
presentation of evidence concerning the charity's inability to carry out its charitable
purpose. The case was not retried, however. New York City decided to purchase the
buildings. Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law, 36 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 366, 369-70 (1971). See also Cromwell
v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
24. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
25. Schaefer Guide to New York Landmarks, reprinted in Record on Appeal at
204, Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 42 A.D.2d 547, 345 N.Y.S.2d
24 (1973).
26. See note 8 supra.
27. 173 N.Y.L.J. at 16, col. 8 (Jan. 23, 1975). The terminal had been the re-
cipient of real estate tax exemptions for three years preceding Penn Central's applica-
tion for a certificate of appropriateness, thus excluding it from the hardship provisions
of the law. See note 19 supra.
28. 42 N.Y.2d at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
29. Id.
30. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149
(1971); see, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Fred F. French
19781
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ers and government is the deceptively simple question of who must
pay when regulation diminishes the value of land to its owner. Justi-
fication for imposing the cost on the property owner rests on the police
power, and courts have proposed various theoretical bases for uphold-
ing its exercise.31 The one suggested most often is the theory that the
government is not required to compensate an owner for a diminution
in the value of his property that has been caused by a police power
regulation so long as the diminution is not excessive.82 As succinctly
stated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,33 "[g]ov-
ernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to prop-
erty could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law."34 Yet, "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."3"
The basic problem, of course, is defining "too far."
To facilitate analysis it is useful to restrict the use of the term
"property" in this section to a technical meaning: legally protected ex-
pectancies. One buys land to acquire its value; value consists of cer-
tain expectancies. For example, the expectancies purchased in farm
land are those inhering in the land. One parcel might command a
higher price because it is especially fertile. Values of urban land, how-
ever, are less dependent on inherent qualities as on intangible attri-
butes. The value of a small site in the heart of a city's commercial dis-
trict, for example, has little to do with any inherent quality other than
location. It may, therefore, be easier to justify denying legal protection
Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976);
Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517
(1954). See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 165
(1974); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. RnV. 1021 (1975);
Gerstell, Needed: A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. LAW. 213 (1976); Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain
and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUIM. L. REv. 708 (1963). For a
bibliography to legal periodicals dealing with historic preservation and aesthetic regula-
tion, see 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275 (1976).
31. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). For cases
discussing the scope of the police power see, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104 (1911); Comrnowealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1951); Barrett v.
State, 220 N.Y. 423 (1917).
32. Sax, supra note 31, at 50.
33. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
34. Id. at 413.
35. Id. at 415.
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to the expectancies in urban real estate because of their less tangible
quality.
36
Legal protection may depend on the competing interests of per-
sons against whom the owner demands protection. For example, a dock
owner may find himself without legal recourse against a boat owner
who has moored his vessel in a storm.37 In the context of land use
regulation, the interests competing with those of the private landowner
are often those of the public in general. If expectancies are taken by
government, an owner will certainly contend that they are property
and that they must be paid for just as if they had been sold to a pri-
vate purchaser. Nevertheless, it is the law that government may take
some expectancies, or, in other words, that not all expectancies are
property-at least not as against the government. The rationale is that
the law cannot reasonably be relied on to protect all of the owner's
expectancies, especially when these conflict with the interests of others
who may also be entitled to legal protection.38 The basic problem may
now be rephrased: for which expectancies does the Constitution de-
mand protection when legitimate and conflicting interests exist?39 A
second but perhaps more important question is -what remedy is to be
awarded to an owner who has been unconstitutionally deprived of ex-
pectancies by a governmental act.
In an attempt to clarify these issues, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has distinguished between a taking of property in the constitu-
tional sense, requiring compensation, and an unreasonable "taking" of
too many expectancies under the police power, requiring solely an in-
validation of the regulation as applied to a particular parcel.40 A con-
stitutional taking of property occurs when there is "government dis-
placement of private ownership, occupation or management." 41 A regu-
36. Sax, supra note 31, at 50-51. Professor Sax has criticized the diminution in
value test in that it presupposes a false definition of property. On the one hand, he
says, underlying the theory is the notion that all legally acquired existing economic
values are property. On the other, the test often permits the tgtal destruction of es-
tablished values by saying the interest affected was not a property right. Id. at 51.
37. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).
38. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). Justice Holmes wrote:
[W]e must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Fourteenth
Amendment to a drily logical extreme. Many laws which it would be vain to
ask the court to overthrow could be shown, easily enough, to transgress a
scholastic interpretation of one or another of the great guarantees in the Bill
of Rights. . . . [A]n ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively
insignificant taking of private property . . . . Id. at 110.
39. See generally Sax, supra note 31, at 50-60.
40. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
41. Id. at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
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lation is an unreasonable taking of too many expectancies if it "renders
the . . . property unsuitable for any reasonable income productive or
other private use for which it is adapted. '42 For instance, denying an
owner the opportunity to develop his land when there are no pre-
existing income producing improvements is an unreasonable imposi-
tion because "it deprives the owner of all his property rights [ex-
pectancies], except the bare title and a dubious future reversion of full
use."' 43 An unreasonable regulation is invalid because it denies the
owner due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
There is a qualitative difference between taking property and a
deprivation of property without due process. As Judge Breitel pointed
out in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 44 however,
this distinction is not new. While courts have historically equated tak-
ing with regulation that imposes too onerous a burden, its use in the
context of police power challenges has been, for the most part, meta-
42. Id. at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. See also Lutheran Church
in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d
at 15; Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 499, 121
N.E.2d 517, 519 (1954).
The Court of Appeals identified two other ways in; which an ordinance may be un-
reasonable. Besides that discussed in the text, an ordinance is unreasonable if its end is
illegitimate, i.e, it does not further the public health, safety, morals or general welfare;
or, if there is no reasonable relation between the means and end. 39 N.Y.2d at 596, 350
N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 10. "Takings" and "deprivations of due process" do
not describe mutually exclusive categories. There are exceptional cases in which pur-
ported regulation 'is in fact a taking. These are where the regulation "is either in-
tended to eventuate in actual public ownership of the land or has already caused gov-
ernment to encroach on the land with trespassory consequences that are largely irre-
versible." 39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9. See New York Tel.
Co. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 41 N.Y.2d 691, 363 N.E.2d 694, 395 N.Y.S.2d 143.
The fear underlying the distinction was articulated by Judge Breitel in an earlier
case:
ihere is no provision in precedent or statutory law for compensating owners
of property because of the impact of unconstitutional legislation. If there were,
the scope of liability would literally be unlimited, when one considers the innu-
merable areas of emergency legislation, often of doubtful constitutionality at least
at the inception, affecting rents, mortgages, legal tender, police power regu-
lation, law enforcement procedures, licensing regulation of every kind and
the like.
Keystone Assocs. v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 850, 307 N.E.2d 254, 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194,
195 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
43. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 597, 350
N.E.2d 381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (1976). But cf. Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of an ordinance
which limited undeveloped lake shore property to its natural uses). In regard to just,
see Costonis, supra note 30, at 1047-49.
44. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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phorical. 45 Rarely has compensation been mandated by a court invali-
dating a police power regulation as applied.46
Commentators and courts have attempted to arrive at a formula
explaining and solving the problem of competing expectancies and the
remedies to be accorded when government exceeds constitutional lim-
its. Professor Joseph Sax has -hypothesized that there are public rights
in privately owned land distinct from both government and private in-
terests.47 He refers to these as "diffusely held interests," and suggests
that there are more such interests worthy of legal protection than have
heretofore been identified. Land uses that have a "spillover or inextri-
cable effect" on other interests, he argues, should be subject to regu-
lation under the police power.48 This is because, unlike nuisances for
example, their effects are not on discrete landowners, but on interests
that cannot be protected through nuisance law.49
Sax distinguishes three categories of spillover effects. A use of land
which results in a physical restriction of the use of other land is one.
Mining coal "which results in drainage on lower-lying land" is an ex-
ample. 0 The second is the use of a "common" that different owners
use for different purposes. For instance, a stream and the ambient air
are commons. Less obvious, but nonetheless a common, is a visual
prospect. "The effects of a vast tower built on a single tract spill over
visually onto other lands just as smoke or noise does." 1 Finally, using
land so as to affect the well-being of others-for example, ".the treat-
ment of land with toxic substances"-or so as to impose obligations
on the community-"such as residential development in a remote area
that would require the furnishing of police protection"-both amount
to spillover effects. 52 In Professor Sax's model the police power may be
used to resolve the conflict no matter what the economic consequences
to either the landowner or society may be. The resolution, he argues,
depends on matters of public policy rather than legal rules.53 Since the
necessity of a solution supports its imposition, none of the competing
interests need be compensated if they are overriden.
45. Id. at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
46. Yd. at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
47. Sax, supra note 30, at 151.
48. Id. at 161. A spillover effect occurs when competing resource users seek "to
make a use that involves some imposition (spillover) on his neighbors, and those de-
mands are in conflict." Id.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 161.
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 172.
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Professor Sax's analysis appears to have influenced the New York
Court of Appeals. Writing for a unanimous court in Penn Central,
Judge Breitel identified in privately owned landmarks diffusely held
public interests deserving of legal protection: "the cultural, architec-
tural, historical, or social significance attached to the affected par-
cel[s]." 54 But unlike Professor Sax, Judge Breitel apparently does not
believe that invoking the police power can justify extinguishing either
interest without compensation. Rather, he states that no matter how
acceptable the purpose, "the landowner must be allowed a reasonable
return or equivalent private use of his property." Thus, regulation
complies with due process when it assures a reasonable return.?' This
analysis appears to be consistent with Pennsylvania Coal, where Justice
Holmes considered due process fulfilled if the regulation did not go
too far, essentially leaving the owner with some expectancies. Implicit
in Justice Holmes' formulation is that the owner will then be assured
a reasonable return on his property.
II. DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF RETURN
Once Judge Breitel had resolved the issue of how to justify New
York City's taking expectancies, two major questions remained: how
to compute return; what compensation may be provided when the
return is not reasonable. The second is discussed below.5" As for the
first, the court concluded that government need not assure a return on
that part of the value of a parcel created through efforts of society and
its government. Once the privately created value has been determined,
the court may then impute income of nearby and related structures
under common ownership with the landmark. But the court never
reached the question of the terminal's precise value and return.
Instead, it examined the history of governmental and societal invest-
ment in the terminal.
A. The Public Ingredient in Value
Acknowledging the validity of the argument that the terminal has
created much of -the value of mid-Manhattan which to some extent
54. 42 N.Y.2d at 330, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
55. Id. at 330-31, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
56. For a discussion and criticism of the diminution in value test see Sax, supra
note 31, at 50-60. See also note 36 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 81-110 infra.
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offsets the governmental outlay, Judge Breitel wrote: "it is of little
moment which comes first, the terminal or the travelers."58 He focused
instead on the interaction of the terminal and society, the former
drawing people, the latter developing the area. The shared role in the
development precludes facile separation of interests. The terminal is
more than a monument to New York City's architectural heritage; it
is also a product of the "interaction of economic influences in the
greatest megalopolis of the western hemisphere." 59 The court felt that
though it was difficult to extract society's portion of the value of the
terminal in precise dollar amounts, it was imperative "to sort out the
merged ingredients and to assess the rights and responsibilities of
owner and society."60
Of primary significance to the court was the special treatment that
railroads have received from society. Government-granted monopolies,
grants of land, past franchises to use city streets, and the special tax
exemption granted to the terminal, all illustrate the pervasive govern-
mental assistance given to Penn Central and its predecessors. The court
also relied on less direct government aid as a factor to be considered
in determining the value on which return is -to be based. The city's
transit system, for instance, "is peculiarly concentrated ... in the area
surrounding Grand Central Terminal."61 Finally, the "massive and
indistinguishable public, governmental, and private contributions"
that served to make the terminal and the railroads a great financial
success in the past were considered in identifying the interests in the
property. 2
58. 42 N.Y.2d at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
61. Id. at 332, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
62. Id. at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919. The concept of public
rights in the Terminal was not advanced by the City in either the Appellate Division or
Court of Appeals. In its brief to the Court of Appeals, the City first argued that the
agreements between Penn Central and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and
the Connecticut Transportation Authority provided massive amounts of aid to Penn
Central. It also argued that the plaintiffs did not attempt to show that the terminal
was incapable of yielding a reasonable return and that they failed to include imputed
rental value of the terminal in their calculations. Finally, the city insisted that the
Biltmore site, as a recipient of transferable development rights, was a viable alternative
since it has access to subway and bus lines, construction costs would be less because of
the special structural problems of building over the terminal, and an office tower on the
Biltmore site would have a better view than one on the terminal site because the
Pan Am building is directly north of the terminal. Furthermore, the city maintained
that even though the Biltmore Hotel would have to be razed, the loss would not be
great since the Hotel has had a declining cash flow. In 1971, the Biltmore had a cash
flow of only $450,000 while the site was valued at $15 million. Brief for Respondent,




What Judge Breitel has done is to characterize the public input
as property. The "privately created and privately managed ingredient
... is the property on which the reasonable return is to be based. All
else is society's . . . . 6 Penn Central then "owns" but an undeter-
mined fraction of the full value of Grand Central Terminal. What-
ever return is owing, it is owing only for that fraction privately
"owned."
Apparent upon reading Penn Central is the lack of judicial prece-
dent for these conceptions.64 It would have been helpful if the court
had explained the theoretical justification for considering societal
investment. A possible underlying principle has been articulated by
Professor John J. Costonis, among others,0 5 who asks: "If [economic]
expectancies are created through no effort of Farmer Brown, why
should they be deemed his 'property'?"'6 Support may also be derived
from the well established doctrine that government may deduct bene-
fits to land created by the taking of adjacent property.6 7 This situation
has often arisen in cases where government confiscates part of an
owner's land in order to build a road."" In determining the just com-
pensation due, government has been allowed to offset the value of
benefits accruing to the remaining portion of the land. This principle,
although originating in eminent domain, may logically be extended to
situations concerning challenges to regulations which do not permit
optimal return.
According to the court, many of the attributes of property are the
result "of opportunities for the utilization or exploitation which an
organized society offers to any private enterprise."6 9 Without govern-
mental investment, "private enterprise could neither exist nor pros-
per. ' 70 Using this analysis -the court perceived railroads as a kind of
joint venture engaged in by private industry, the public and govern-
63. Id. at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
64. Id. at 332-33, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19.
65. See, e.g., R.W.G. BRYANT, LAND: PRIVATE PROPERTY PUBLIC CONTROL 160
(1972).
66. Costosis, supra note 30, at 1033.
67. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Celeste v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 951,
290 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Ct. Cl. 1968). In Bauman, the Court said:
when part only of a parcel of land is taken for a highway, the value of that
part is not the sole measure of the compensation or damages to be paid to the
owner; but the incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to be
considered.
167 U.S. at 574.
68. E.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).




ment. Without the latter two, the court said, 'the terminal property
would be worth a fraction of its current value and its owners would
not complain of an inability -to earn a reasonable return.7
1
The court failed to mention, however, that just as private enter-
prise often depends on governmental investment, so also does govern-
ment depend on private enterprise. The opportunities society creates
for exploitation are created for society's benefit. While it is true that
it is of little moment which came first, the terminal or the travelers,
it is a strange bargain where both the developer and investor are
unaware of precisely what the latter has paid for. It could be argued
that society got its due when the railroads were built, people were
employed, and the nation's economy was 'bolstered.72 But the court's
analysis was not based on the existence of an actual contract; the
joint venture was not one entered into for specific and discrete ends.
Moreover, though the court spoke of benefits peculiar to railroads,
it did little to limit the application of the public ingredient concept.
"The historical, cultural, and architectural resource that remains was
neither created solely 'by -the private owner nor solely 'by the society
in which it was permitted to evolve."73 This language suggests a
changing conception of property; one that recognizes that many of the
values of land are not the property of its holder. As Professor R.W.G.
Bryant has written: "In urban areas . . . the values of land are Iuch
less obviously due to the proprietor; they are almost wholly created by
the community. Therefore, they must be regarded in principle as the
property of the community." 74
71. 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
72. See Ball v. New York Cent. R.R., 229 N.Y. 33, 127 N.E. 493 (1920). The
court cites Ball as support for the proposition that without governmental support rail-
roads would have had little chance for survival. But note the following language from
Ball: "The immunity which we have attributed to the [railroad] springs from necessity
in the fulfillment of its public functions. The general welfare and prosperity demand its
existence. Private convenience and interest must yield to it. . . . The [railroad] must
fulfill its duties to the public." 229 N.Y. at 43, 127 N.E. at 497.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, railroad were considered vital to so-
ciety's development.
The transportation of passengers upon railways is one of the most extensive
and important of the material interests of the country. There is no other,
perhaps, which affects so large a number of persons, and at the same time is
liable to become so essential to life, and health, and comfort, and everything
else, which makes up the sum of social happiness and enjoyment.
Redfield, Railway Passenger Traffic, 1 AMER. LAw REG. (n.s.) 1, 2 (1861-1862).
73. 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
74. BRYANT, supra note 65, at 350. Professor Bryant's book provides an excellent
exposition of this view and its consequences. Judge Breitel has suggested that legis-
latures experiment with statutes that provide formulas for determining the social in-
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B. The Elements of Return
The Landmarks Preservation Law defines reasonable return as
"six percentum of the valuation of an improvement parcel."70 The
valuation is the "current assessed valuation established by the City."7"
According to .the court, basing the return on present earnings, which
may reflect managerial inadequacy, would "frustrate any land use re-
strictions. ' 77 Instead, a court must look to the parcel's capacity to
produce a reasonable return. Furthermore, the potential return need
not be realized directly by the parcel in question if, as here, the
owner also holds neighboring sites that benefit from the landmark's
existence. Analogizing the present situation to that of a "flagship store
in a regional shopping center,"78 Judge Breitel pointed to Penn Cen-
tral's midtown hotels-the Biltmore, -the Commodore, the Barclay,
and the Roosevelt-and argued that some of the hotels' income must
be imputed to the terminal3 9
The conclusion hat the terminal contributes to the earnings of
Penn Central's neighboring holdings is a plausible one, though the
court fails to explain the causal connection. Hotels are filled with
travelers each year, but how many of these travelers arrive by train?
Many workers in Penn Central's office buildings are undoubtedly com-
muters, but the burden should be on government to show the existence
and amount of imputable income.8 0
gredient. Breitel, A Judicial View of Transferable Development Rights, 30 LAND
UsE L. AND ZONING DIG., No. 2, at 7 (1978).
75. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0 v(1) (1976).
76. Id. § 207-1.0 v(2). See generally Hellerstein v. Assessor of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1,
332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1975).
77. 42 N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at.919. The Court of
Appeals has yet to pass on the 6% figure. This figure has been criticized as a legislative
attempt to usurp the judicial function by arbitrarily fixing the point at which regula-
tion goes too far. Podell, The Landmarks Act: Preservation or Confiscation? 165
N.Y.L.J. at 1, col. 4 (June 9, 1971).
78. 42 N.Y.2d at 331, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
79. Id. The court spoke in the most general language. It did not explain how it
arrived at this conclusion; it presented no statistics tending to support the notion that
the terminal's presence is economically beneficial to "Penn Central's other, more
profitable, enterprises." Id. at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. Instead,
the court cited G.R.F., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, id., 366 N.E.2d at 1276-77,
397 N.Y.S.2d at 920 (citing 41 N.Y.2d 512, 362 N.E.2d 597, 393 N.Y.S.2d
965 (1977) ), which concerned a challenge to tax assessments. Judge Breitel, writing
for the court in that case, said that since the property in question was a flagship store
in a shopping center, part of its construction cost "may reflect not value to the flag-
ship store, but value to the remainder of the typical shopping center." 41 N.Y.2d at
514, 362 N.E.2d at 599, 393 N.Y.S.2d. at 967.
80. While a land owner in Penn Central's position can argue that it is entitled
to a profit on each of its properties, this argument misses the point of Goldblatt v. Town
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III. THE MEASURE AND FORM OF COMPENSATION
As noted earlier, New York's diminution in value test requires
that a regulation be found unreasonable if it renders the property un-
suitable for any reasonable income productive use.8' The court sug-
gested, however, that providing some compensation for the loss that
accompanies regulation may make reasonable an otherwise unreason-
able restriction. Thus, if after computing value and return there is
still an excessive burden on a particular landowner-meaning, in the
context of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law, that the
return is less than six percent of the value--government may save its
regulation by providing "reasonable" compensation. 82
A. "Just" or "Fair"?
Professor John J. Costonis has identified and expanded on glim-
mers of judicial recognition of an intermediate power between the
eminent domain and police powers.8 3 Briefly, what he calls the accom-
modation power is exercisable by government when private land is not
acquired outright and "where fair compensation for burdened land-
owners would seem an ethical imperative."8' 4 There is no clear category
of situations in which regulation goes too far under the police power
yet cannot be deemed a constitutional taking. Suffice it to say that land-
marks preservation, given policy imperative and individualized eco-
nomic burden, is an obvious candidate for the power's invocation.
The accommodation power requires that "fair" rather than "just"
compensation be given to affected property owners. Fair compensation
differs from just compensation in three ways. First, the amount given
under fair compensation is the difference between the parcel's eco-
nomic return under the challenged restriction and what Professor
Costonis calls the "Reasonable Beneficial Use" standard, rather than
under what he calls the "Allowable Use" standard.85 The difference
between the .two standards is illustrated by the instant situation. Rea-
sonable beneficial use of the terminal property is, by legislative deci-
sion, a six percent return on the assessed valuation of the property.8 6
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), which allowed a drastic reduction in the value of
the land in question to its owner.
81. See text accompanying notes 30-46 supra.
82. 42 N.Y.2d at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
83. Costonis, supra note 30, at 1055; Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
84. Costonis, supra note 30, at 1049.
85. Id. at 1052.
86. NEw YORK Cr-Y; N.Y., ADmiN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0 v (1976).
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Any landmark designation causing a property to receive less than a
six percent return would require compensation for the difference.
The Allowable Use standard, on the other hand, would require com-
pensation for the difference between the maximum return receivable
on the terminal property as is and the return receivable if the property
were used to the fullest extent under present zoning restrictions. The
latter standard is applicable to eminent domain situations. 7
The two types of compensation also differ with respect to form.
"[Flair compensation may take the form of any marketworthy alterna-
tive, whether or not monetary" whereas just compensation must be in
dollar amounts.8 s Finally, the procedures for determining the amount
required for fair compensation would be, according to Costonis, less
cumbersome than those of a formal eminent domain proceeding.
B. Transferable Development Rights
Although Judge Breitel 'has criticized Professor Costonis' formula-
tion,89 he seems to have embraced, at least implicitly, many of its prin-
ciples. In Penn Central he concluded that "reasonable" compensation
may be provided in the form of transferable development rights
(TDR) : "These substitute rights are valuable, and provide significant,
perhaps 'fair', compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal
itself." 90 While there are defects in New York City's transfer plan, the
court said, this recognition does not preclude its justification.,,
A comparison of Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of
New York 92 and Penn Central, the two major opinions concerning
87. Costonis, supra note 30, at 1051. See generally P. NICHOLLS, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.2 (3d ed. 1976-1977).
88. Costonis, supra note 30, at 1052.
89. Breitel, A Judicial View of Transferable Development Rights, 30 LAND UsE L.
& ZONING DIG., No. 2, at 7 (1978).
90. Id. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 922. See Costonis, supra
note 30.
91. 42 N.Y.2d at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. New York
City's transfer plan is embodied in NEw YORK Crry, N.Y., ZONING REs. §§74-79, 74-791
to -793 (1975). See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preserva-
tion of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REV. 574 (1972). See generally J. COSTONIS,
SPAcE ADRIFT (1974); THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEw T aar-
NIQUE OF LAND UsE REGULATION (J. Rose ed. 1975); Note, Development Rights
Transfer and Landmarks Preservation-Providing a Sense of Orientation, 9 URBAN
L. ANN. 131 (1975); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,
83 YA E L. . 75 (1973); Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 372 (1971); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City,
82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development
Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
92. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
[Vol. 2 7
PENN CENTRAL
TDR, both written by Judge Breitel, provides a tentative, though un-
satisfying, answer to the question of when a transfer of development
rights is legally successful.
Fred F. French dealt with a challenge to a zoning amendment
which created a special park district and rezoned two private parks as
public, thereby preventing the owner from constructing proposed tow-
ers on the park sites. The amendment permitted transfer of the de-
velopment rights to any lot within a designated receiving area "zoned
to permit development at the maximum commercial density." 93 The
court found that the park designation was not conditioned upon the
"effective utilization of the transferable development rights." 94
The court held the transfer unconstitutional. It admitted that the
development rights of the park had not been nullified by the city's ac-
tion. Because the rights had been made transferable to a section of
mid-Manhattan rather than a "particular parcel or place,"' 95 however,
the court concluded that the mandatory transfer plan failed to "assure
preservation of the very real economic value of the development rights
as they existed when still attached to the underlying property." 96 Judge
Breitel wrote:
[I]t is a -tolerable abstraction to consider development rights apart
from the solid land from which as a matter of zoning law they derive.
But severed, the development rights are a double abstraction until
they are actually attached to a receiving parcel, yet to be identified,
acquired, and subject to the contingent future approvals of admin-
istrative agencies, events which may never happen because of the
exigencies of the market and the contingencies and exigencies of ad-
ministrative action. 97
The failure stemmed from the fact that the severance rendered
the development rights' value so uncertain and contingent as to de-
prive the landowner of their practical usefulness, "except under rare
and perhaps coincidental circumstances." 98 The development rights,
"an essential component of the value of the underlying property,"'99
were thus rendered useless to the landowner, and, since there was no
income producing structure on the parks, the owner was deprived of
all his property rights. 00
93. Id. at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
94. Id. at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
95. Id. at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
96. Id. at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
97. Id. at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
98. Id. at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.




In Penn Central, on the other hand, not only did the challenged
regulation permit "productive use of the terminal site as it had been
used for more than half a century, as a railroad terminal,"101 but plain-
tiffs also were not "wholly deprived of the development rights above
the terminal."' 0 2 The rights had been made transferable to other sites
in the vicinity, some of which were owned by Penn Central. Judge
Breitel argued that the TDR were not made worthless by the fact that
several of the potential receiving parcels were encumbered by long-
term leases or had suitable buildings: "The knowledge that at some
future time, when the lease term has run out or the improvements
have lost their utility, a larger building could be constructed, should
increase the value of the building plot, at least so long as there is a
market demand for new construction."103
The two cases are thus distinguishable in two ways. In Fred F.
French, there was no possibility of earning a reasonable return on the
parks once the development rights were severed and there were no
sites to which these rights could be immediately attached, whereas in
Penn Central, not only could the terminal provide a return, but there
were sites to which its development rights could attach and thus pro-
vide some compensation for their severance. The important distinc-
tion, however, lies in the effectiveness of the transfer plan in each case,
neither of which discussed what would seem to be the crucial criterion
for determining a plan's viability: present value of the severed rights.10 4
Had the transferred rights in Fred F. French been considered valu-
able, the forced relinquishment of the parks' development rights would
have been upheld, regardless of the nonexistence of any income pro-
ducing structure. 0 5
In Penn Central Judge Breitel seems to consider the mere exist-
ence of named receiving sites as determinative of the transferred rights'
value. While the attachability of TDR is certainly important, it is but
one of .two factors essential to determining the value of TDR. The
other, of course, is the existence of a market. Nevertheless, Penn Cen-
101. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
102. Id. at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
103. Id., 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921. See Newport Assocs. v. Solow,
30 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 283 N.E.2d 600, 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (1972): "Air rights
• . .are valuable and transferable, even if only as an adjunct to a reversion or to a
long-term leasehold." Id. (Breitel, J., concurring).
104. Costonis, supra note 30, at 1067-68.
105. However, Norman Marcus, Counsel to the New York City Planning Com-
-mission, stated that a substantial offer had been made for the rights. See Marcus,
Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Man-
hattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. lv. 77, 84 n.22 (1974).
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tral has virtually ignored the latter and seems to have drawn an odd
distinction between two kinds of presently unusable TDR-attached
and unattached. The -former is deemed to preserve the value of severed
development rights; the latter is not. But -the theoretical difference be-
tween attached and unattached TDR, without regard to the present
value of -those rights, is little consolation to an owner who must accept
a deduction of his economic expectancy because of transferred develop-
ment rights that have been attached to a site upon which their use is
economically impractical. Assuming zoning restrictions remain un-
changed any added value to the receiving site(s) would be minimal,
since it would have to be discounted for the presumed life of the pres-
ent improvements on the receiving site.10
In Fred F. French, Judge Breitel said that none of the discussion
invalidating the city's transfer plan was intended to invalidate any and
all TDR schemes. 1 7 He cited with approval Professor Costonis' "Chi-
cago Plan,"'08 which proposes the creation of a bank that would fund
the acquisition costs of development rights from owners unwilling to
accept a transfer plan. The pooled rights could then be sold as neces-
sary to meet costs.109 This plan avoids any pitfalls-the fluctuations in
demand for new construction, for example-that an open market on
development rights might bring."10 In Penn Central Judge Breitel in-
dicated approval of another kind of transfer plan: transferring rights
between sites owned by the same person. The fear and assumption un-
derlying both opinions would appear to be that TDR are not salable
on the open market. But whereas the "Chicago Plan" contemplates a
system that treats all property owners equally, Penn Central does not.
The "Chicago Plan" would at least compensate for the loss of develop-
ment rights based on their present value; the Penn Central approach,
however, does not consider present value to be as important as attach-
ability. An owner of multiple sites is thus placed at a disadvantage.
Furthermore, it has not 'been proved that TDR are not marketable.
Penn Central's scheme eliminates the possibility of attempting to cre-
106. It is not altogether clear that Judge Breitel would disagree that the TDR
are of minimal value here. His point is that because the rights are attachable, they have
a significant value that may provide enough compensation to uphold the designation.
The burden of showing that the TDR provide insufficient compensation, however, is on
the landowner, as it would be in any challenge to a valid regulation.
107. 39 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
108. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HAv. L. Rv. 574 (1972). See also note 76 supra.
109. Costonis, supra note 108, at 590-91.
110. See Shlaes, The Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL
J. 526 (1974); 90 HAtv. L. REv. 637, 642 n.51 & accompanying text.
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ate a development rights free market, which would, by considering
construction demand and administrative contingencies, ascertain the
present value of TDR and thereby their usefulness as compensation.
CONCLUSIONS
The New York Court of Appeals has now spoken twice on New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law. In Lutheran Church in
America v. City of New York,"' the court invalidated the designation
of a residence once owned by J. P. Morgan, Jr., later purchased by the
Lutheran Church in America, a religious corporation. Although the
court said there were sufficient findings of fact as to plaintiff's hardship,
it did not explicate these findings." 2 Economic hardship seems to have
been established by the city's failure to challenge plaintiff's contention
that the century-old home was inadequate as an office building.18
There was some discussion of the taking issue,114 but the decision seems
limited to an invalidation of the law's provisions concerning charitable
organizations," 5 specifically in instances where the organization wants
to replace the structure." 6
Discussing Lutheran Church, Judge Breitel, in Penn Central, said
the Church "did not and could not reap -the same pecuniary benefits
of massive governmental investment enjoyed by the railroads and
Grand Central Terminal."' 7 He did not, however, explain Lutheran
Church's failure to consider the possibility of transferring development
rights, 1 8 or imputing income from other nearby properties which the
Church might have owned. If, as suggested above, Lutheran Church
is limited to one deficiency in the law, then its discussion is perhaps
a gloss on Penn Central-an attempt to harmonize the landmarks pres-
ervation decisions.
Regardless of Judge Breitel's intention, Penn Central's scope is
the broader of the two and its rationale may apply in situations out-
side of landmarks preservation. Although there are certain limiting
111. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
112. Id. at 133, 316 N.E.2d at 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18 (dissenting opinion).
Judge Breitel concurred in the dissent in Lutheran Church.
113. Id. at 128, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
114. Id. at 128-29, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
115. See note 22 supra.
116. Id. at 131-32, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
117. 42 N.Y.2d at 334, 366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 920. The Church,
however, has "always been entitled" to the benefits of a real estate tax exemption. Id.
118. 35 N.Y.2d at 133 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 313 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.2.
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words in the opinion,"19 Judge Breitel, in recapitulating the holding,
said that "a property owner is not absolutely entitled to receive a re-
turn on so much of the property's value as was created by social invest-
ment."'120 Thus the court may tentatively have accepted a changing
notion of property in value.
The flagship concept also may represent a changing approach to
considerations of land use regulation challenges. Its use in Fred F.
French could have resulted in an affirmance of the City's plan. The
Tudor City complex includes hotels, restaurants, shops, and over 3300
apartments, most of which face the parks.' 12 Assuming that there is at
least as close a relationship between the parks and the complex as there
is between the terminal and Penn Central's hotels, i.e., that one of the
major attractions of living in Tudor City is the parks,'22 the court
could easily have imputed income from the complex to the parks. In
his discussion of Fred F. French, Judge Breitel indicated that permit-
ting the land to be used only as parks denied -to the owners productive
use of their property. 23 But these parks might be producing a reason-
able return if one considers their drawing power.
It is doubtful that there are many designated landmark owners in
Penn Central's position; however, those that are will certainly have a
difficult time convincing a court to view their property holdings sepa-
rately. Imputation of income will become especially important where
the landmark uses the maximum floor area ratio'2s permitted under
the applicable zoning ordinance, thus rendering TDR an unusable
compensatory tool.
As critics of the use of the police power to achieve landmarks pres-
ervation point out, though, most landmarks do not use the maximum
floor area ratio. By upholding the use of TDR, Penn Central has pro-
vided for a logical remedy -to the problem which arises when landmark
owners do not receive a reasonable return on their property. 25 TDR
119. Id. at 328, 366 N.E.2d at 1273, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
120. Id. at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
121. Marcus, supra note 105, at 80.
122. "There was immediately an adverse public reaction to the owner's proposals
[to build the towers on the parks], especially from Tudor City residents." 39 N.Y.2d at
592, 350 N.E.2d at 383, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
123. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
124. Floor area ratio "is an index figure which expresses the total allowable floor
area of a building as a multiple of the area of its lot. A 10,000 square foot lot, in a
district where the FAR was twelve, would thus be limited to a maximum of 120,000
square feet of floor space." Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82
YALE L.J. 338, 346 (1972).
125. Landmarks using the maximum floor area ratio may be the least profitable
of all landmarks since they were not constructed in a time of energy consciousness.
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may be used in combination with other forms of relief to achieve
equity between society's and individuals' desires. But it is important
that any TDR program be evaluated in terms of its present economic
viability.
Penn Central has been accepted for appeal by the Supreme
Court.126 If upheld, the case will have important implications at least
in the landmarks preservation area. In addition Penn Central presents
the Court with an opportunity to clarify questions left open by Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead,12 and, more important, an opportunity
to embrace a broader view of public rights or property in land value.
Judge Breitel's opinion provides a cogent, though not altogether satis-
factory, exposition of -this view; clarification and acceptance of its
theories would make land use regulation an easier task for society.
As stated so eloquently by Judge Breitel in Fred F. French, "no
property is an economic island, free from contributing to the welfare
of the whole of which it is but a dependent part.' ' 128 There are re-
sponsibilities owed to society that compel a land owner to sacrifice
some of his economic expectancies. The limits to government action
are fairness and proportionality, not absolute equality between legiti-
mate goals and private interests.' - Just as fairness limits exercise of
government's regulatory powers, so also does fairness proscribe indi-
vidual land owners from exploiting the constitutional safeguard against
arbitrary takings.uo Penn Central may be merely a waystation on the
route to an enlightened law of land use. As Judge Breitel so aptly
stated: VThe last word has not only not been spoken; it has hardly
been envisaged."' 131
DAvm W. SHAPIRO
126. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d
1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), prob. juris. noted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Dec. 6,
1977) (No. 77-444).
127. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). According to Professor Sax, it is unclear whether
Goldblatt was following or repudiating the diminution in value test. See Sax, supra
note 31, at 42-43.
128. 39 N.Y.2d at 599, 350 N.E.2d 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
129. Id.
130. See generally Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36; Sax, supra
note 31, at 57; Marcus, supra note 105, at 95.




The Supreme Court affirmed Penn' Central,132 and declined to
address the more esoteric and potentially far-reaching aspects of Judge
Breitel's opinion. Before reaching the substantive issues, the Court
noted that because the record did not
contain a basis for segregating the privately created from the pub-
lically created elements of the value of the Terminal site and since
the judgment of the Court of Appeals in any event rests upon bases
that support our affirmance . .. we have no occasion to address the
question whether it is permissible or feasible to separate out the "so-
cial increments" of the value of the property.133
The Court thus recognized the legitimacy of the law and of its ap-
plication to the terminal apart from consideration of modes of com-
puting return.
34
The Court then addressed the primary question: whether or not
the law effected a taking within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment. 35 From prior cases it culled "the factors that have shaped the
jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment injunction 'nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation,' "136 and
concluded that "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" into the circum-
stances of each case constitute the proper "formula" to be applied. 37
Consideration must be given to the economic impact of the regulation
"and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment backed expectations."'' 38 Also relevant is the
character of the governmental action, with a taking more readily found
"when the interference... can be characterized as a physical invasion
by Government."' 39
In response to Penn Central's broad constitutional arguments, the
Court stated that the loss of the opportunity to exploit one property
interest believed available for development, or mere diminution in the
property value, is insufficient to establish a taking. 40 Nor does it
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 46 U.S.L.W. 4856 (U.S.
June 27, 1978).
133. Id. at 4861 n.23.
134. Id. at 4861.
135. Id. at 4861 & n.24.
136. Id. at 4861.
137. Id. at 4862.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
140. Id. at 4863-64.
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
amount to discriminatory zoning since the law embodies a compre-
hensive plan, and buildings are not arbitrarily designated. Further-
more, Penn Central is not the only owner affected; in fact, the Court
did not challenge the City Council's assertion that the law benefits
Penn Central. 141 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the law
represents the City's acting in an enterprisal capacity: "This is no
more an appropriation of property by Government for its own use
than is a zoning law prohibiting, for 'aesthetic' reasons, two or more
adult theatres within a specified area."'
1 42
The narrow taking question-whether the law so severely bur-
dened the property's use as a terminal-was resolved against Penn
Central because the Court found no interference with the present
use.' 43 Furthermore, the law allows a reasonable return on Penn Cen-
tral's investment, 44 and the transfer of development rights "undoubt-
edly mitigate[s] whatever financial burdens the law has imposed
. ... "45 The Court stressed Penn Central's present ability to use the
terminal "for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion";140 a
future change in circumstances might compel a different result.
The Court's decision is of great import to municipalities en-
gaged in designating landmarks-that regulatory power is now un-
questionable. Regulations are to be examined in light of their effects
on "distinct investment backed expectations."' 147 Thus, institution of
141. Id. at 4864.
142. Id. at 4865 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976)). See generally Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, The Moral Politics of Porn, 27
BuFFALo L. Rav. 1 (1977).
143. The Court stated that "the law does not interfere with what must be re-
garded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." 46
U.S.L.W. at 4865.
144. Id. The law assures a reasonable return on the "assessed valuation" of a
parcel containing a designated landmark. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
The Court characterized this provision "as permitting Penn Central not only to profit
from the Terminal but to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment." 46 U.S.L.W.
at 4865. See also id. at 4858, 4863 n.26. A reasonable return on the assessed valua-
tion may not, therefore, be constitutionally mandated. See note 147 & accompanying
text infra.
145. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4865. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that
transferable development rights have value and provide a form of compensation. See
text accompanying notes 89-110 supra.
146. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4865 n.36.
147. Id. at 4862. Penn Central's "primary expectation" concerning the use of the
terminal is, according to the Court, "as a railroad terminal containing office space and
concessions." Id. at 4865. Limiting the owner to that use and at the same time, assur-
ing a reasonable return on Penn Central's investment did not amount to a taking. Id.
This situation is distinguishable from that in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), because there a statute "frustrate[d] distinct investment backed ex-
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the private and public ingredient concept may have been implicitly
sanctioned. Perhaps the Supreme Court will eventually rule on the
permissibility of distinguishing public and private increments in value.
Until then, at least, the last word concerning not only Grand Central
Terminal, but all other property, has not been spoken.
D.W.S.
pectation' to such an extent as to have "the same effect as the complete destruction
of rights" purchased in the land. Id. at 4862-63. See text accompanying notes 30-56 &
144 supra.

